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In Chile under Allende 
By Claudio Duran 
(Formerly Vice-Dean of the Polytechnic Institute in 
Santiago, Chile, and now teaching at York University) 
From the information that "The New York Times" has 
been giving since the fall of 1974 concerning the 
role of the C.I,A. in the overthrow of the late Salva- 
dor Allende, President of Chile, it is clear which 
groups received direct or indirect help from that 
agenc3. The role which some of these groups such as 
the truck owners played is also clear, But there 
has been little concerning the role of "El Mercurio" 
the ~ a i n  right wing newspaper. A distorted image of 
El i~lercurio as a democratic force has been presented 
in several articles in the Times without any attempt 
of criticism. For example, the Times of September 
20, 1974 quoted a C.I.A. official as saying that most 
of the funds "invested for propaganda purposes went 
to El Mercurio, the main opposition newspaper in Chile. 
It was the only serious political force among the news- 
pnpels and television stations there." It was in fact 
a subversive force, working for a foreign power for 
the overthrow of a democratically elected president. 
Recently the Senate Intelligence Committee reported 
that "the C.1.A. covertly channeled $11.5 million to 
El Mercurio, the largest daily paper in Chile, to in- 
sure anti-Allende coverage and to keep the paper 
solvent. " (The New York Times, December 5, 1975). 
The report also stated that El Mercurio is published 
by Augustin Edwards a close friend of Donald M. 
Kendall, president of Pepsi-Cola, Inc,, and said 
that the committee's assassination account "noted 
that Mr. Kendall had arranged a breakfast meeting 
between Mr. Edwards, Mr. Kissinger and the then 
Attorney General John N. Mitchell." Presumably this 
meeting would have discussed the kind of help that 
the C . 1 . A .  could give to the Chilean newspaper. 
Those attending represent the main powers that organ- 
ized the resistance against the Allende government: 
the Government of the U.S, (Mitchell was also a 
member of the Forty Committee at that time), the 
C.I,A,, the Multinational Corporations (Edwards had 
just been appointed Vice-President of Pepsi-Cola) 
and the Chilean bourgeoisie. 
However the real role that El Mercurio played is 
by no means clear. It is the intention of this arti- 
cle to present some evidence as to that role and to 
show that the "anti-Allende coverage" was not inno- 
cent. On the contrary its propaganda campaign was 
carefully planned by propaganda experts trained in 
psychoanalytic techniques to increase the paranoia 
and sense of distress and profound unease amongst 
the middle class and the military. 
After the October 1972 strike was over, El Mercurio 
began an enormous and sensationalist coverage of 
"organized crimen, in order to generate a real fear 
that stable social. order and accepted values were 
being severely undermined and to link the "crimes1' 
with Allende's Popular Unity coalition and the 
"marxist s ' I .  
The display of news about "crime" was particularly 
intense during the parliamentary election campaign 
between November 1972 and Match 1973. Before this 
and between July and October of that year (1972), 
El Mercurio published another impressive number of 
news items about "marxist violence", This subject 
was replaced by "criminal violence1' during the elec- 
tion campaign, 
Was "organized crime" really increasing in Chile? 
Was it really a social danger? In fact, no; there 
was no evidence of that. But El Mercurio opened its 
campaign with a strange article on the editorial page 
in the issue of November 13, 1972. The article was 
called "On the Verge of Collective Insainityl' and it 
said, essentially, that the Chilean people were los- 
ing their traditional rationality and their respect 
for the law, a fact which left them defenceless in 
the face of many kinds of dangers. As an example the 
article mentioned a recent case when a taxi driver 
had short another driver who crashed into his car. A 
week later, El Mercurio published another article on 
the same page, "Alarming Wave of Assaults" which re- 
ferred to the existence of a "very dangerous gan " 
called "Los Chaquetas Negras" (The Black Jackets 7 . 
The gang was presented as a "high ranking criminal 
organization", and it was said also that the country 
was for the first time in its history confronting a 
Gang like that, 
After the election El Mercurio reduced considerably 
the publication of news of this kind. Had "organized 
crime" diminished in Chile because of an election? 
Had it diminished all of a sudden because the opposi- 
tion to Allende had got 54% of the votes? Impossible! 
No, the earlier campaign had been an effort to 
"infl~ence~~ the election. 
Of course El Mercurio had a rather open strategy 
designed to defend what it considered the traditional 
values of Chile. The main theme in its strategy was 
the "Need for Order" a theme which continued to be 
stressed after the coup. For example in the September 
22, 1974, issue it said: ''A first requisite for the 
existence of civil freedom is order and the main 
reason why this country began to sink into oppression 
has been disorder" (editorial page). But the fact is 
that to "prove" that Allende had brought disorder to 
the country El Mercurio developed among other things 
the I1organized crimef1 tactic, That emphasis height- 
ened the middle class anxieties that were genuine 
enough because of real problems: queues, black market, 
food speculation, economic disorder, etc, 
But the question is, Why weren't these real problems 
enough to show the disorder? Why "addt1 to that the 
Invention of an increasing and terrifyicg "criminal 
violence"? In figures, on what El Mercurio published 
between November 6, 1972, and March 4, 1973, (in the 
main pages, namely the front, editorial, the last of 
the first section and the first of the third section) 
it came to 183 items on "organized crime", 169 on 
economic disorder and 163 on queues, black market, 
shortages and food speculation altogether. Among the 
"criminal vi01ence~~ stories it published a large number 
of news items referring to "agression on children" 
(almost 25%). 
The reason for this is simple. El Mercurio was 
trying to create a state of psychological tension 
beyond the real one, a state of tension which could 
produce finally a primitive panic. 
The emphasis on "organized crime" as an important 
propagandistic effort to show disorder during Allendeg1s 
government continued after the coup, In the same 
issue mentioned above El Mercurio says in its main 
editorial that there is "evidence that the country 
was falling into anarchy, systematic crime and civil 
was. " 
In the last 2 or 3 months of Salvador Allendeos 
government El Mercurio increased its psychological 
warfare campaign. It began to work in purely 
"intra-subjectiver1 aspects. The psychological ten- 
sions were indeed already enormous, so that people 
were in a state in which that could be done easily. 
El Plercurio then carried a substantial number of 
I stories which were ained at arousing very deep anx- 
ieties, for example food anxieties corresponding to 
i a deep unconscious level; claustrophobia, the fear of 
being destroyed internally; fears of being assassinat- 
ed, etc. They comtituted amlliantly conceived and 
executed campaign t~ make the Chilean people paranoid 
and thus to prepare them to support a military action 
with all its repressive consequences. 
With regards to the military themselves, of course, 
this propaganda had its effect as well, El Mercurio 
developed specific propaganda to produce and increase 
panic among military leaders, After the attempted 
coup on the 29 of June, 1973, Indonesia's massacre of 
communists was presented as a logical and human reac- 
tion of the military and the people when they "dis- 
covered" that the communists were planning to kill 
the generals and the commanders-in-chief of the armed 
forces "Jakarta" (a word which had been written on 
the walls of Chilean cities since 19'71 by the extreme 
rightist group Fatherland and Freedom) was falsely 
presented as a Popular Unity attempt to assassinate 
the highest officers of the armed forces. The "Jakarta" 
tactic is strikingly similar to what actually happened 
in Chile: first the Junta fabricated a story that the 
Popular Unity had a special plan to kill the highest 
officers of the armes forces (Plan Z); second, the 
Junta than killed many thousands of people. 
It appears clear now what the role of "the only 
serious political force among the newspapers and tele- 
vision stations" in Chile, really was: terrorism, sub- 
version and sabotage via psychological warfare. 
The question remains, though, as to the extent to 
which ltpublic opinion" is aware of the power of 
manipulation by the mass media. What would be the 
reaction of the Chilean middle class if they knew 
that El Mercurio was helped by the C.I.A. for the 
purpose of inducing paranoia? But of course they 
can't know because the Junta leader, Pinochet, 
Augustin Edwards, and other right-wing owners have 
complete control of the media in Chile and don't 
tell them. This is the much vaunted "free presstf in 
action, triumphant in the suppression of information 
that might enlighten people. 
THE PRIME CENSORS IN THE MEDIA ARE TBE BASSETTS 
John Bassett, chairman of CFTO-TV and the owner of the 
defunct Toronto Telegram told the LaMarsh Commission 
on media violence that he was "shocked and horrified1' 
at Commission researcher Ken Marchant's suggestion 
that newspaper violence be censored, licensing estab- 
lished. Marchant in the January, 1976, Interim Report, 
said aovernments "could consideru this measure or 
alternatives. Bassett 's "cry wolf" reminded me of 
research on the Ontario election coverage of 1967 in 
which Bassett's Telegram flagrantly slanted the news 
to favour the Tories. Who really censors the news? 
Why, it's an Inside ~ o b r  Earle Beattie 
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